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1.  Introduction 
East Asian countries have been said to be on their way towards regionalism for many years. 
Just as many other regional trade agreements that are mainly involved in developing 
countries, the institutional progress of East Asian regional integration seemed to be a topic in 
the papers until the last decade. The participation of Japan, Korea, China and ASEAN has 
made it feasible that East Asian countries come together to create the third largest regional 
economic entity in the world following EU and NAFTA.  
More than eighty regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) have been 
implemented in Asia (Kuroda, 2006), over half of which are signed by East Asian countries. 
The various degrees of liberalization and the different paces in the negotiations have made up 
a dazzling network, which prevents us from having a comprehensive picture on the real 
process of East Asian regionalism. In contrary to the EU and NAFTA, it is popularly believed 
that the integration in East Asia is indeed driven by the cross border connection within its 
business sector instead of the formatted integration. It would be an alternative for us to 
understand the process and the structure of East Asian regional integration more easily based 
on the observation on the de facto integration of East Asian economies, rather than the one-
by-one interpretation and comparison of legal terms in agreements.  
However, if East Asian regional integration is initiated by the market mechanism, to 
what extent has the market driver influenced the bilateral trade flow between East Asian 
countries? Is it possible to measure and compare their de facto bilateral trade relations 
quantitatively? Suppose the prospective institutional building in East Asia would mostly base 
on this market-initiated regional integration, what could be a possible arrangement of East 
Asian regionalism? To investigate the de facto trade liberalization in East Asia, this paper 
regards bilateral trade relations as parts of the policy frictions that may influence trade flows 
via their impacts on trade cost and introduces a new method to measure countries’ de facto 2 
bilateral trade relations in relative terms by calculating BTR index (“index of bilateral trade 
relation”). In combination with HM index (“index of Hubness-Measure”), it plans to outline 
the structure of East Asian regional integration and suggest a possible approach towards East 
Asian regionalism from pure economic perspectives.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces method to calculate the BTR 
index and the “economic distance” between countries. Section 3 reviews some policy debates 
on East Asian regional integration. Section 4 investigates the formation of East Asian regional 
integration. It evaluates the relative intensity of intra-regional trade and calculates BTR index 
and HM index, based on which it will also image an “economic map” of East Asia. Moreover, 
it will also evaluate the influence of China-ASEAN FTA (CAFTA) in the progress of East 
Asian regional integration. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  To measure the de facto Bilateral Trade Relations 
2.1  The logic and methodology 
The basic idea to get the BTR index is to decompose the policy frictions from the gravity 
model. This is based on two considerations: first, bilateral trade between countries increases 
with the expansion of economic size and contracts with the growth of the costs of trade
1; 
Second, policy frictions can play a much more decisive role on trade than natural frictions. 
Suppose two countries, A and B, hold the a priori advantages needed for opening trade with 
each other (ie. both of them are big economies, they are adjacent, they have a similar cultural 
background, a similar language, and so on), this does not necessarily mean that they would 
become close trade partners. For instance, if the government of country A implements extra 
restrictions on trade with country B, then it is very unlikely that the two countries will end up 
trading at the level that a priori natural factors would suggest. In this case, even though 
                                                 
1 Since the distance between countries seems to be the primary determinant of the cost of transportation, the 
geographic measurements are used for simplification.  3 
natural conditions would encourage the two countries to trade freely, we may fail to observe 
substantial trade flows between them because the government of country A artificially 
undermined natural trading preference.  
Basically the determinants of bilateral trade between countries (or regions) can be 
classified into two categories: trade cost and partner countries’ properties, such as GDP, 
population, and GDP per capita. Lowering trade costs will encourage bilateral trade between 
countries while increasing costs may discourage it. Trade costs could be roughly grouped into 
two categories. One is the natural frictions, typically transportation costs that are induced by 
the geographic distance, technology and trade infrastructure. The other is the policy frictions, 
such as technical barriers and trade facilities. Because of the non-discrimination of 
multilateral trade liberalization, one may regard the policy frictions as the mirror of the de 
facto bilateral trade relations when comparing the relative closeness of trade partnership 
between economies. Since the regional integration in East Asia is market-led, the policy 
frictions existing in bilateral trade between East Asian countries may reflect how close the 
two economies are driven by the market. In the short run, the policy frictions could be 
regarded as the “fixed effects” that exist between countries on the level of bilateral trade. The 
estimation based on the time series could be seen as the average effects of the policy frictions 
during the period under investigation.    
It is worthwhile to mention that just like many other empirical studies, the method 
presented in this paper is not totally neutral from critiques theoretically. Besides those flaws 
that are inherited from the gravity model, the calculation of the BTR ignores the fact that the 
exclusion of other factors that could affect the bilateral trade flows (such as common language 
effects, common border effects, etc.) from the estimation will lower the precision of the index. 
Moreover, since the elasticity of economic size on international trade has been assumed to be 
identical throughout the sample, it is very likely that the index is biased in favor of those 4 
countries whose development depends more on international trade. In principle, for those 
countries whose trade policies are freer, the value of BTR should be relatively lower than 
those whose bilateral trade is more restricted by governments.  
2.2  The gravity equation  
The gravity equation is chosen to pool all these trade determinants. It may be one of the 
most popular models used in empirical studies of international trade and migration in the last 
fifteen years. Historically, Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) independently developed it 
first in a series of econometric models of bilateral trade flows (Deardorff, 1984). Since then, 
various versions of gravity-type models were widely applied in the empirical studies. Taken 
from the famous Newtonian Gravity theory, the equation can explain the relationship of trade 
flows between countries, and their geographic and economic properties quite well. Similar to 
the result obtained in physics, which tells us that the gravity between two objects is positively 
related to their masses and inversely related to the distance between them, the gravity model 
shows that the larger the economic size of the trade partners, the higher the possible bilateral 
trade flow between them, while the higher the trade cost, the lower the bilateral trade flow 
may occur. 
It has been very successful empirically in fields such as the examination of bilateral 
trade patterns and “natural” regional trading blocs (Frankel, Stein and Wei, 1996); the 
estimation of trade creation and trade diversion effects from regional integration (e.g., 
Mendez and Brada, 1985; Hamilton and Winters, 1992; Baldwin, 1994). The high degree of 
flexibility of the model allows for many “versions” of approaches. In the study of trade blocs, 
there are two commonly used approaches. One is the “dummy variable” approach, which was 
especially popular in the last decade. The simplicity of the procedure and the straightforward 
results are the key advantages of the method, even if it is constrained by the use of dummy 
variables. The other approach is called the “factor endowment-based gravity equation” 5 
approach, which essentially uses instrumental variable methods to solve a “multivariate, 
multiplicative error-in-variable problem.” (Saxonhouse, 1993) With a constructed tolerance 
interval indicator and a given probability, one can consider those observations falling outside 
the tolerance intervals as signs of regional bias. The large number of extreme observations 
suggests that there is significant internal trade bias and the existence of a trading bloc. This 
method provides us with a quantitative approach to the study of trading blocs. However, the 
conclusion may depend closely upon the tolerance interval chosen. Moreover, since different 
factor endowments must be classified and the estimation for each sector in turn must be 
performed, it is relatively complex in application. 
Though the gravity equation is initially “discovered” in empirical studies, its theoretical 
foundation has also been shown by economists based on various assumption and models. 
After Anderson’s (1979) first formal attempt to derive the gravity equation under the 
assumption of product differentiation, many economists also tried to prove the model 
theoretically via different approaches, such as Bergstrand (1989), who explored the model 
associated with monopolistic competition, Helpman and Krugman (1985), who justified the 
model based on an IRS type of model. Most recently, Deardorff (1995) found the gravity 
model to be consistent with a wide range of trade models including the H-O model, either 
with frictionless or with impeded trade. The differences in these theories help to explain the 
various specifications and the diversity in the results of the empirical applications. Anderson 
and Wincoop (2003) derive a theoretical gravity equation based on the assumption of 
differentiated goods from different country of original and CES utility function, in which they 
show that trade barriers are determinants of inter regional trade. Their model also shows that 
in the gravity model the effects of trade barriers are various according to the economic sizes 
of trading partners.  6 
The gravity equation simplifies the determinants of bilateral trade between countries (or 
regions) into two categories: partner countries’ properties, such as GDP, population, GDP per 
capita, etc. and trade cost of trade between partners, such as transport costs, tariff barriers, 
quotas, etc.. Lower trade costs will encourage bilateral trade between countries while higher 
costs will discourage it. Loosely speaking, there are two types of trade costs. One is related to 
“natural frictions”, such as the geographical distance, level of technology, etc., and the other 
is related to “policy frictions”, primarily the degree of bilateral liberalization.  
As normal, GDP and GDP per capita are used to describe a countries’ economy and the 
distance between the capitals of the two countries is employed to approximate “natural” trade 
costs. It is assumed that the marginal effect of either GDP or GDP per capita on bilateral trade 
is identical, and that the marginal effect of distance can be magnified or shrunk by individual 
bilateral trade relations.    
The marginal effect of each trade determinant on bilateral trade can be represented in a 













=                                               (1) 
where α, β and  ij γ  represent the marginal effect of GDP, GDP per capita(K) and distance 
respectively. It is assumed that α and β are identical while  ij γ  could vary related to countries’ 
bilateral trade relations. That is, the bilateral trade relation can influence bilateral trade flows 
via its impacts on the elasticity of the geographical distance. In practice, equation (1) is 
estimated in a logarithm form as equation (2) expresses.  
  
,, , , , log( ) log log log log log( ) ij t i i t j j t i i t j j t ij ij ij t Trade C GDP GDP K K Dist u α αβ β γ =+⋅ + ⋅ +⋅ + ⋅ +⋅ +    (2) 
where  ( ) log ij t Trade  denotes the logarithm of total bilateral trade flow at time t;  , log it GDP  
and  , log jt GDP denote the logarithm of countries annual GDP;  , log it K and  , log jt K  denote the 7 
logarithm of countries’ annual per Capita GDP; log(Distij) denotes the logarithm of the 
geographic distance between the trade partners’ capitals; uij,t is the disturbance.  
The lower value of  ij γ  will be interpreted as the closer bilateral trade relation between 
the two countries. If the average value of  ij γ is smaller than the average world level, the 
bilateral trade between the two economies is said to be “intensive”. That is, they have 
relatively closer bilateral trade relations with each other. Besides the technological progress 
that directly affect on reducing the transportation cost, the progress of trade liberalization 
tends to improve countries’ trade relations and therefore lower the value of  ij γ over time. 
When countries fully relax their restrictions on trade (as the situation would be with respect to 
trade within the same country), bilateral trade may only be constrained by the transportation 
cost related to the geographic distance.
  
2.3  The panel data framework 
The term “panel data” refers to the pooling of observations on a cross-section of 
households, countries, firms, etc. over time periods. Econometrically, a panel data regression 
is different from either cross-sectional regression or time series regression. Variables in a 
regression equation of panel data normally have two subscripts: one denotes the time period 
while the other denotes the different objects (countries, individuals) of analysis. We can write 
this as 
,, , ´ it it it YC X u β =+ ⋅ +     i = 1, ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅, N; t = 1, ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅, T                                (3)  
where the subscript i denotes the section, t denotes the time period. Furthermore, in order to 
use a one-way error component model for the disturbances, we need to decompose the last 
term ui,t as,     
,, it i it uv µ =+                                                                                            (4) 8 
where i µ  denotes the unobservable individual specific effect and  , it v  varies with individuals 
and time, which can be thought of as white noise. The most significant advantage of this 
formulation is that we are able to capture the individual propensity on trade for each pair of 
trading partners. 
The two most popular models of panel data are fixed-effect model and random-effect model. 
Eisenhart (1947) distinguished the two models into “class I” and “class II”. Scheffé (1956) defines 
“class I” as fixed-effect model and “class II” as random-effect model. Theoretically, “fixed-effect” 
model applies to determine the existence of true differences among the estimated mean of section-
specific errors; while the latter is used for the analysis on variant components since all effects are 
assumed to have zero mean. The “random-effect” is therefore a more restrictive model than the “fixed-
effect”. In practice, we normally apply Hausman-type specification test to evaluate the consistency of 
the estimates from random effects models and therefore to select fixed-effect versus random-effect 
model. Briefly speaking, the Hausman test is essentially a test of the hypothesis that random effects 
would be consistent and efficient. Under the null hypothesis, the random-effect estimators are 
consistent and efficient, otherwise it is inconsistent; the fixed-effect estimators are always consistent 
but only efficient when the null hypothesis is rejected. 
2.4  To derivate BTR index from bilateral trade flows 
Imaging that policy frictions can affect a country’s bilateral trade flow through their 
impacts on the geographic distance, the economic distance (EDij) can be defined as 
geographic distance (Distij) multiplied by a parameter A, which essentially reflects the relative 
degree of bilateral trade liberalization.   
EDij=A*Distij                                                                                       (5)              
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To estimate equation (6) in the logarithm form using the fixed effect model as equation (7) 
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The smaller value of BTRij hints the higher degree of market openness of country i to country 
j. Furthermore, BTRij <1 can be interpreted as a signal of “pro-trade” effects of bilateral trade 
policy that encourage country i to import more from country j, while BTRij >1 is a signal of 
“anti-trade” effects showing the additional cost of country i’s import from country j due to 
political frictions. 
3.  Debates on East Asian regional integration 
Fujita (2005) argues that Asian regionalism, as well as that in America and Europe, seems to 
be part of the recent globalization of the world economy. Due to the continual reduction in 
transportation costs, the world economic activity is relatively concentrated into these three 
regions. Of these East Asia is indeed the fastest growing. East Asian “highly integrated 
manufacturing system” allows the region to play as an “export platform” in the global 
economy. He points out that the neutral integration in East Asia has reached such a “critical 
stage” that a region-wide institutional scheme might be necessary to promote further 
integration in Asia. This is agreed by Watanabe (2006), who believes that East Asian 
countries are working to setup more government-level agreements to enforce their de facto 
market-driven integration founded on a common production bases across the region. Kuroda 
(2006) shares this opinion but extends it to pan-Asian integration. He expects to see a “multi-
track and multi-speed approach” to pan-Asian integration, of which some countries would 
“play a leadership role.” 10 
Kawai (2004) tries to explain the logics behind various initiatives for institutional 
cooperation from three aspects. First of all, he points out East Asian countries have long 
enjoyed “market-driven” integration through trade and foreign direct investment. On one 
hand, intra-regional trade as a share of East Asia’s total trade has reached 54 percent in 2003, 
which has exceeded that of NAFTA. On the other hand, mainly via foreign direct investment, 
regional production networks and supply chains have been set up by locating different sub-
processes in various countries in Asia.  Secondly, Asian countries are now facing challenge 
from the EU and NAFTA in global market. It is more urgent to secure an integrated market in 
a regional scope especially when multilateral trade negotiation is at an extremely slow pace. 
Finally, the Asian financial crisis gave Asian countries a lesson on the importance of regional 
monetary and financial cooperation. It made many East Asian countries realize the lack of 
capacities to meet global challenges individually (Kim, 2004). Because of the slow pace of 
multilateral trade liberalization, they move toward regionalism as an alternative to 
synchronize regional economy in global competition. These three drivers are summarized by 
Stubbs (2002) into three terms - the “long term regional trends,” “competitive regionalism,” 
and “the Asian economic crisis.”  
Yamazawa (2001) emphasizes that China’s entry to WTO and emerging move toward 
regional free trade agreements might motivate other Asian countries to go for deeper 
integration. China is currently the second biggest economy in the region behind Japan. As one 
can see, it has established close trade relations with its neighbors, especially Korea and some 
key member states of ASEAN, who are also important trade partners with Japan. Historically, 
Japan seemed to be reluctant in leading the progress of East Asia regionalism. It may be when 
China showed its interest in the regional integration did Japan adjust its strategy and turn in an 
active negotiator on free trade agreements. To some extent, the term “competitive 11 
regionalism” may refer to not only the competitiveness among the three big blocs, but also 
that within East Asia.   
As Fujita (2005) comments: … the economic integration of East Asia has been attained 
mostly through market mechanisms,… However, now East Asia has reached a critical stage 
such that for a further promotion of regional integration, developing region-wide political 
institutions is indispensable. As East Asian regionalism seems to be initiated by the market 
itself rather than any top-to-bottom arrangement, one important reason for East Asian 
countries to accelerate their paces of trade liberalization might come from the appreciation of 
a deeper integrated economy that is desired by the market. Consequently, it is possible that the 
community building of Asian regionalism would be closely related to those intra-regional 
linkages that already play the fundamental role on shaping the “neutral” integration of the 
regional economy.  
Different from NAFTA, where the U.S. could be an is unambiguous leader, and from 
EU, which is well institute-constructed, the situation in East Asia is rather intricate partially 
because of economic gaps among member nations plus the lack of an effective super-national 
institution or an overwhelming leader in the region. The existence of two big economies in the 
region, Japan and China, makes it hard to predict the direction of the regional integration in 
East Asia. It seems that neither the experience of EU, nor that of NAFTA could be directly 
cloned in East Asia. First, a well-organized intergovernmental structure is one of the 
significant characteristics of EU-type integration, which is almost impossible to be repeated in 
Asia. East Asian countries are so different from each other in their stages of development. For 
instance, their GDPs range from 2.6 billion US dollars per year (Lao, PDR) to about 5 trillion 
US dollars per year (Japan) 
2; and their populations range from 0.4 million (Brunei) to 1.3 
                                                 
2 The data is statistics of year 2005. Data source: The World Bank online WDI database. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/. 12 
billion (China). It might not be an easy task to bring East Asian countries together under an 
intergovernmental institution such as that of EU where there is one vote per nation.  
Second, the NAFTA type of integration might be applicable but needs to be employed 
by East Asia under preconditions. Though a balanced situation without hegemony in the 
region seems to be more welcome by most Asian countries, there are at least thirteen 
countries (ASEAN+three) in the region that might be included into the integrated regional 
circle. That means a network composed of at least 78 bilateral FTAs is necessary if trade 
liberalization is done bilaterally. The modest condition to make the NAFTA type available is 
that the ten ASEAN countries should speak in one voice like an integrated economic unit. In 
that case maybe only six bilateral trade agreements (between Japan, Korea, China and 
ASEAN) are enough to cover an integrated network of East Asian economies. Therefore, one 
precondition to transplant NAFTA’s experience will be the deeper integration of ASEAN 
countries. Another “hard-to-deal-with” issue might be to harmonize Japan and China. 
Probably that is why the initiative of “ASEAN plus three”
3 (ASEAN plus Japan, Korea, and 
China) has received so much attention since its first summit. 
Indeed, since the geopolitics of East Asia is quite different from that in Europe or North 
America, it is quite reasonable to see that East Asia will find its unique approach to 
regionalism based on its de facto region-wide integrated economy that is generated by the 
market mechanism. Basically, any approach to the community building of East Asia would be 
“acceptable” as far as it could meet three principles - openness, equality and evolution.
4   
                                                 
3 It is an informal group whose formation was motivated by the East Asian crisis. It does not have its own 
secretariat but meets at the invitation of ASEAN. The first meeting of the group occurred in December 1997. 
4 It is so called “open regionalism” (Bergsten, 1997, and Drysdale et al., 1998). Openness required non-
discrimination and transparency in trade and economic policy, as well as in diplomatic stance. Equality implied 
that activities needed to be of mutual benefit to all participants and recognized the rapid transformation in the 
structure of economic and political power taking place in the region. And the evolution of the process of regional 
cooperation recognized the importance to success of a gradual, step-by step, pragmatic and sustained approach to 
economic cooperation based on consensus building and voluntary participation. 13 
In a series of papers, Baldwin (2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2006) comprehensively analyzes 
regionalism in a “hub-and-spoke” framework and suggests East Asian regional integration to 
be in the “bicycle” formation. He concerns about the underlying connection between trade 
liberalization and industrial relocation that is theoretically founded on New Economic 
Geography (NEG)
5. NEG discovers interactions between trade policy and industry relocation 
across country borders in theory. Briefly speaking, though trade liberalization can increase the 
overall welfare, it is not guaranteed that all the participant countries can be better off because 
the consequential cross border industry relocation might bring about long term impacts on the 
economy. Throughout the process of the market integration, policy makers from each party 
might be required to choose appropriate trade policies and implement the appropriate 
strategies when shaping the picture of trade liberalization. Even a temporarily inappropriate 
policy might lead to the unrecoverable welfare loss at the end.  
One reason is that trade liberalization will allow producers to reconsider their business 
under the circumstance of an integrated market instead of several fragmental markets. The 
markets can be easily fragmented when trade barriers are high. Some producers choose to 
produce in big markets simply because of the larger demands; while some others choose small 
markets where competition is relatively less intense. The removal of trade barriers will 
however make big markets more attractive to producers because industries may find it more 
profitable to base their productions in big markets. From these they supply to the host market 
directly and export to markets that are relatively small under free trade. There are three key 
advantages of locating in big market: First, given demands from the whole free trade zone, 
sales to the domestic market can bring about higher markups than exports to foreign countries 
because of the existence of transport costs. Second, to be located close to upstream and 
downstream partners will help firms increase their efficiency. Third, though the competition 
                                                 
5 The theory of NEG is initially raised by Krugman (1991) and later enriched by others such as Fujita et al. 
(1999) and Baldwin et al. (2003).  14 
effect in big markets will reduce firms’ profits by lowering the industry price index, in the 
long term the equity of real wages decreases nominal wages in big markets as price declines. 
Baldwin (2003a) refers the ‘hub-and-spoke’ pattern as a possible outcome of regional 
trade liberalization where one or few nation(s) become the center of the regional economy 
because the relatively bigger market size(s) or the better initial conditions of trade facilities at 
the starting point might be able to attract more industries to move in at the cost that the 
markets of other economies in the region will shrink when eliminating the border barriers. 
Intuitively one may define the core economy in the regional free trade zone as ‘hub’ and title 
the others ‘spokes’. Moreover, the formation of the “hub-and-spoke” pattern will be a self-
enforced process. It will be hard to be revised once it gets started in forming driven by the 
market mechanism. Because of this possible outcome of free trade, policymakers need to set 
up their policies carefully lest domestic economies be marginalized as a result of regional 
trade liberalization. Generally speaking, there will be at least three advantages to be a “hub” 
rather than a “spoke” in the integrated regional economy: First, as many industries will 
agglomerate into the hub nation, the hub-based firms could be more efficient and more 
competitive. A “hub-and-spoke” formation might favor industries in the hub nation at the cost 
of industries in the spoke nations. Second, most new investments will choose to flow into the 
hub nation because the investors would normally find more potential in the big market(s). 
Such decisions may meanwhile re-enforce the advantages of the big market(s). Last but not 
the least, the self-enforced agglomeration will lead to a one-way process of industry 
reallocation in the region - ‘Once a particular location gets a head start, it may be extremely 
difficult for other regions to catch up as investment deterring effects of the current hub and 
spoke system may have consequences that last far beyond the termination of that system’.
6 
                                                 
6 See http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/03013101.html 15 
East Asian economies seem to be looking for institutional scheme to deepen the initial 
market-led regional integration in the last decade. For most of them, it might not be a good 
idea to apply the laissez- faire policy as trade liberalization that is purely directed by the 
market mechanism might drive them to the “spoke trap”. Instead, the analysis of the possible 
“hub-and-spoke” formation might be helpful for them to better design their approach towards 
a more integrated region.  
4.  To picture the pattern of East Asian regional integration 
4.1  The intensity of intra-regional trade in East Asia 
A starting point is to demonstrate the existence of the intensive intra-regional trade among 
East Asian economies using the gravity model containing augmented with dummy variables. 
The regressions are based on 87 countries’ bilateral trade data in year 2001.  
,, , , , log( ) log log log log log( ) ij t i i t j j t i i t j j t ij ij ij t Trade C GDP GDP K K Dist Dummy u α αβ β γη =+⋅ + ⋅ +⋅ + ⋅ +⋅ + ⋅ +  (8) 
The definitions of dummies used in the estimation are listed below: 
Variable Definition 
DUMMY_East Asian countries as the 
importers 
The value equals 1 if the importer is from East Asia; 
otherwise the value is 0. 
DUMMY East Asian countries import 
from non-East Asian countries 
The value equals 1 only if the importer is from East Asia but 
the exporter is outside the region; otherwise the value is 0. 
DUMMY_East Asian countries as the 
exporters 
The value equals 1 if the exporter is from East Asia, 
otherwise the value is 0. 
DUMMY East Asian countries export to 
non-East Asian countries 
The value equals 1 only if the exporter is from East Asia but 
the importer is outside the region; otherwise the value is 0. 
DUMMY_ East Asian countries trade 
with each other 
The value equals 1 only if both the importer and the exporter 
are from East Asia; otherwise the value is 0. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
Each coefficient in the logarithmic function essentially represents the elasticity of the 
corresponding independent variable on the bilateral trade flow. We first run the OLS 
regressions. All the coefficients have the expected signs and at high level of significance in 
statistics. Column (1) shows the estimators of the basic equation, while the estimation shown 16 
in columns (2) to (5) include the dummy variable(s) to measure the specific effect on trade of 
East Asian countries. As that the gravity model suggests, both the export country’s and the 
import country’s GDPs have significantly positive impacts on the bilateral trade flow, which 
is at the same time discouraged by geographic distance. The effect from the countries’ GDP 
per capita is not always significant and stable however. The coefficient of the dummy in 
column (2) equals 0.57, showing that East Asian countries are more open to imports in 
comparison to most of the countries in the world given the assumption that the other factors 
have the identical impact on cross border trade. In 2001 East Asian countries import about 
77% more than the volume predicted by gravity equations. On the other hand, East Asian 
countries’ export almost three times as much as the world’s average level given the same 
factors. These findings reflect that East Asian economies in general rely much more on 
international trade than other countries worldwide. Given the similar economic and 
geographic conditions, trade between two East Asian countries is around 2.3 times higher 
than the trade flow between two countries outside East Asia. The net trade “bias” within the 
region listed in Column (5) measures the real intra-regional trade preference more precisely. It 
shows that given the same trade conditions, the import between two East Asian countries is 
about twice as great as the average import from a country outside the region. On the other 
side, East Asian countries also export more (25% more) to each other than their exports to 
those partners outside the region. 
However, the OLS regression (whether or not considering fixed effects) on the gravity 
equation has been criticized for its inconsistent estimators due to the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. One possible solution is to follow Santos Silva and Tenreyro’s (2005) 
approach to apply Poisson pseudo-Maximum Likelihood method to obtain the consistent 
estimators of the gravity model.  17 
One could see the inconsistence of OLS estimation from some basic algorithms. In the 
traditional logarithmic form of the gravity equation, we have ln(Yij)=β0·ln(A)+βi·ln(Xi) 
+βj·ln(Xj) +β1·ln(Xij), where Yij denotes bilateral trade between country i and j; Xi and Xj 
denotes country specific factors of i and j respectively; and Xij denotes the “common” factors 
between them such as geographic distance. Transforming the equation above we have 
Yij=exp[β0·ln(A)+βi·ln(Xi) +βj·ln(Xj) +β1·ln(Xij)]                          (9)  
The corresponding conditional expectation in general term is E(Yij ¦ Xi, Xj, Xij). The 
individual observation can therefore be presented as yi=E[yi¦xi]+εi = exp[xi·β]+εi . More 
precisely, the logarithmic function for the regression is  
ln(yi)= xi· l β + ln(ηi), where ηi=1+ εi / exp(xi· β)                            (10)  
The OLS estimators on this equation are consistent only when the second term on the 
right hand side, ln(ηi), is statistically independent from xi. In order to eliminate xi from the 
function of ηi we need to find a random variable vi that is independent from xi and meets the 
condition vi=εi / exp(xi· β), which implies a very specific condition on the error term. 
Furthermore, when the error term and explanatory variables are independent, the conditional 
variance of yi should be proportional to exp(xi· β). However, because of yi ∈[1,∞), the 
variance of yi tends to be closer to zero as the value of yi approaches its lower bound; while 
the deviations from the conditional mean of yi will go up when yi is moving to the opposite 
direction. It is therefore not realistic to assume that the conditional variance V[yi¦xi] in the 
OLS estimation is proportional to exp(xi· β). Therefore the OLS estimators on the log-linear 
model tend to be inconsistent. 
Though the alternative non-linear least squares (NLS) method could be used to resolve 
the problem of inconsistence, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2005) shows that the NLS 
estimators are normally inefficient. In NLS  l β =arg 
2
ii b min [y -exp(x b)] ⋅ ∑ , which implies 
the first order condition ∑ ˆˆ
ii i i [y -exp(x )] exp(x ) x ββ ⋅ ⋅⋅ ⋅ =0. The inefficiency comes from the 18 
fact that the equations might be weighted more on those observations with larger value of the 
second term,  ˆ
i exp(x ) β ⋅ . To improve the efficiency of NLS estimators, one needs to 
identify/assume the specific form of the conditional variance instead of assuming the 
conditional variance to be constant. The beauty of the Poisson pseudo-Maximum likelihood 
(PML) estimation is that it assumes the conditional variance as proportional to the conditional 
mean and takes into account the non-negative feature of yi. The disturbance from the large 
conditional mean  ˆ
i exp(x ) β ⋅  will be offset by corresponding larger conditional variance. 
Holding the assumption that the conditional variance V[yi¦xi] is proportional to the conditional 
mean E[yi¦xi]= exp(xi· β), we estimate the parameter β by solving the first order condition 
∑ ˆ ˆ
ii i [y -exp(x )] x β ⋅⋅ =0. Moreover, Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognon (1984) shows that the 
function does not even have to be Poisson distributed or to be an integer. As long as the 
appropriate function of E[yi¦xi] is defined, the estimators of PML will be consistent and 
efficient.      
The second part of Table 1 prints down the results based on PML regressions. The 
coefficients of the dummy variables in all regressions are positive and significant in statistics. 
It shows that East Asian economies trade much more than the world’s average level (around 
60% more in imports and double in exports). Under the same conditions, trade between two 
East Asian countries is much more intensive than that between an East Asian country and its 
trade partner outside the region (95% higher in imports and 43% higher in exports). In short, 
either OLS or PML estimation show the existence of a de facto regional trading bloc within 
East Asia. Intra-regional trade between East Asian countries is more intensive than the 
world’s average level from either the aspect of imports or that of exports.    
At the first glance, all coefficients in the estimations on Equation (8) have the expected 
signs. Most of them are at high level of significant in statistics. As that Gravity model 
suggests, both the export country’s and the import country’s GDPs have significantly positive 19 
impacts on the bilateral trade flow, which is on the other side discouraged by geographic 
distance. The effect from the countries’ GDP per capita is also positive but not always at high 
level of significant in statistics. The coefficient of the dummy in column (2) equals to 0.46, 
which means East Asian countries are in general more open to imports in comparison to most 
of countries in the rest of world given that the other factors have the identical impact on cross 
border trade. In 2001 East Asian countries import about 58% more than the volume predicted 
by gravity equations. The exports from East Asian economies are also more intensive – as it is 
shown in column (3), they export almost double as the world’s average level. The “net” 
relative intra-regional trade intensity of East Asian economies is evaluated by the estimation 
that present in Column (5). Given the same trade conditions, the imports of one East Asian 
economy from another East Asian economy will be about twice as much as the imports from 
its extra-regional partner country; meanwhile the exports between the two East Asian 
economies will also be over 40% more than the average exports from one East Asian 
economy to another country that is outside the region. 
4.2  The de facto bilateral trade relations and the economic distance between East 
Asian economies 
It is further assumed that countries i and j will normally treat each other reciprocally 
and therefore the bilateral trade relation between them could be symmetric. That is, 
BTRij=BTRji. Since one country’s import from country j is not only affected by its own import 
policy but also by its trading partner, country j’s export policy, one might image the bilateral 
trade relations are the “pool” of both countries’ import and export policy. In practice, it might 
not be easy to distinguish their different effects on the bilateral trade. Accordingly, the 
economic distance is calculated based on the definition ij ji EDE D = = ij ij ji ji BTL Dist BTL Dist ⋅ =⋅. 
[Table 2 about here] 
[Table 3 about here] 20 
Table 2 and Table 3 show the symmetric BTR index and “economic distance” between 
major Asia-Pacific economies. As expected, BTR index could either “prolong” or “shorten” 
the geographic distance between countries. Since BTR index measures the de facto bilateral 
trade relations in relative terms, the comparison of countries’ bilateral trade relations across 
different pairs of countries would not be affected by the function’s specification although it 
might be systematically affected by the accuracy of the geographic distance
7. The results 
shown in Table 2 reaffirm trade orientation of East Asian countries. The generally low value 
of BTR index reflects a rather freer intra-regional trade environment in East Asia in 
comparison to the world’s average level. Taking the fact that there is so far no formal 
institutional integration in the region, it is also evident of the de facto regional integration that 
is driven by the private sectors. East Asian economies might have strengthened their 
interdependence via intensive intra-regional trade facing the global competition. 
Table 3 shows the observed economic distance between each country taking into 
account both natural and political factors. In combination of Table 2 and Table 3, one could 
have four key observations. First, the six major ASEAN member states—Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam are not only geographically, but also 
economically close to each other. In addition to the short geographic distance that facilitates 
their bilateral trade, the political interests of economic integration might also have shown the 
influences on tightening their economic connections via the cross-border exchanges of 
commodity and services.  
Second, the observed economic distance between China and Korea is just about 1/5 of 
either that between Japan and China or that between Japan and Korea. The bilateral trade 
                                                 
7 The estimate of BTR might be lower (or higher) than its real value when the geographic distance used is over 
(or under) estimated. Generally speaking, it might be less accurate for those countries with big geographic size 
than for small countries. For instance, in reality most of the exports from China to Malaysia should be shipped 
out from GuangZhou harbor, which is much closer to Malaysia than that of its capital. However, in this dataset, 
the distance between Beijing (the capital of China) and Kuala Lumpur (the capital of Malaysia) was still used to 
proxy the transportation between the two countries. The artificial magnification of the transportation distance 
leads to an estimator of BTR index that is under-estimated.   21 
between China and Korea has been going rapidly since 1990s. China has overtaken the U.S 
and Japan to be the biggest trading partner of Korea while 15years before, China was just the 
seventh biggest export market of Korea. Besides the fast growth of both countries’ economic 
sizes, the facilitation of bilateral trade seems to be one of the significant factors in explaining 
such an expansion of bilateral trade. 
Third, trade costs between China and the main ASEAN countries seem to be quite low 
generally. In history, the main economies in ASEAN have played significant roles in the start-
up phase of the development of Chinese economy. There were a large number of Chinese that 
immigrated into Indonesia, Malaysia (Singapore) and Philippines in the late 1800s and early 
1900s. These people and their offspring are often called “Nanyang Huaqiao” (“overseas 
Chinese in Southeast Asia”). Based on the statistics as compiled by the Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Commission of the Republic of China, there are in total about 40 million Overseas 
Chinese worldwide. Sixty percent of them are living in ASEAN countries: Indonesia (19%), 
Thailand (18%), Malaysia (16%), Singapore (7%) and Philippines (3%)
8. Though Overseas 
Chinese is still minority population in most of these countries (except in Singapore), their 
economic influences are quite significant in the local economies. It is generally believed that 
Overseas Chinese are the bridges between China and most of Southeast Asian countries. 
Indeed the majority of foreign investments came from Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia in 
the first 10-15 years after China implemented its “open door” policy in 1979. It would be 
quite reasonable to say Overseas Chinese have played some fundamental roles in 
strengthening connection between China and most of ASEAN countries.  
Albeit the value of BTR index between Japan and its partners is on average higher in 
comparison to that between other East Asian countries, it is generally
9 less than one, meaning 
Japan still applies “trade-promoting” rather than “trade-resisting” policy to its neighbor 
                                                 
8 The percentages in the brackets represent the share of the total population of Overseas Chinese in the world.  
9 It is except that with New Zealand and that with Vietnams. 22 
countries in Asia. Even though it seems that trade cost with Japan is relatively high, Japan is 
undoubtedly one of the most important trading partners to most East Asian economies. The 
gravity equation shows that international trade is not only determined by trade cost but also 
the participants’ economic sizes. As the biggest economy in the region, the GDP of Japan is 
still about four times of that of China, the second biggest country. To some extent, one might 
image the “mega-size” of Japanese market could compensate its relatively closed economy 
and thus the relatively “long” economic distance between Japan and other Asian countries.  
4.3  The relative market importance 
Besides the comparison of the bilateral trade relations and the economic distance 
between East Asian economies, one might also need to evaluate the relative market 
interdependence when filtering the individual “hub” candidate(s) from the economic 
perspective. One may set up two criteria of the “hub” candidate(s): first, its market size is big 
enough; second, it is open enough to allow other countries to access to its market. To some 
extent, these two conditions are allowed to compensate with each other. In practice, Baldwin 
(2003a) applies the HM index (“index of Hubness-Measure”) to describe the “East Asian 
bicycle”, of which Japan plays as the hub of the bigger wheel while China is the center of the 
smaller wheel. The formula to calculate this index is:  
HMB = XAB · (1-MBA)                                                                         (12) 
where HMB measures the ‘hub-ness’ of country B to country A. XAB denotes the exports from 
A to B as a share of country A’s total exports; MBA denotes country B’s imports from A as a 
share of its total imports. The value of HM ranges from zero to one, of which the closer the 
value to one, the deeper the relative dependence of country A’s exports on country B’s market.  
[Table 4 about here] 
In Table 4, the number in the bracket ranks the importance of the markets. The number 
“1” means the most important market to the country, the number “2” means the second most 23 
important market; while the number “9” means the most “ignorable” market. For instance, the 
HM index of China to Japan is 7.68 percent; the number “1” between the brackets indicates 
that to Japan, Chinese market is generally more important than that of any other East Asian 
economies; while from China’s standing point, the HM index of Japan is 12.72 percent, 
meaning Japan is also the most important market to China within the region. For each 
individual country, the “overall rank” is calculated by simply summing up their ranks in each 
row. The country with the lowest value of “overall rank” will be concluded as the most 
important market in the region. In this case, Japan and China are the two most markets in the 
regional to most of Asia-Pacific countries.  
4.4  Japan and China as the two individual “hub” candidates 
Based on the both HM index and BTR index, the first argument of this paper is that 
Japan could be an individual “hub” candidate in Asian regionalism. It might not be rational 
for other Asian economies to be alleviated from Japanese market, which is so big in either the 
absolute term or the relative term even though the values of BTR indexes hint that the 
negotiation with Japan might not be as easy as that with some other more open economies 
(Singapore for instance). In other words, the benefits from accessing the Japanese market may 
drive other countries to input more resources into the free trade negotiation with Japan. 
However, unlike the U.S. in North America, Japan is not yet the overwhelmingly dominant 
economy in the region from the aspect of market independence. The U.S. and EU are very 
important external markets to East Asian countries. Economically they might be able to affect 
the process of East Asian regionalism to some degree despite that their roles in East Asia are 
far less significant than that in the western hemisphere (Baldwin, 2005). Fujita (2005) points 
out that East Asia seems to be a multi-cored economy from the dimension of economic 
geography. Although Japan is still the most important market in the region for most of its 
Asian neighbors, it faces challenges from China, who has grown so fast to compete for the 24 
leadership of the regional economy. Moreover, China seems to have made much more 
progress in regional trade liberalization than Japan since its entry to WTO. It might be quite 
questionable that Japan could keep its position without actively participating in the process of 
regional integration.  
[Table 5 about here] 
Second, China might be a second “hub” candidate in the region. In relative terms, China 
is already the most important market in Asia for the other two big economies, Japan (the 
world’s second biggest economy) and Korea (the world’s eleventh biggest economy). In 
particular, China provides a most important market for the exports from Korea, meaning that 
Korea might give China more weight than Japan (or at least as much as that Japan has) when 
considering to liberalize bilateral trade relations. Furthermore, in addition to its close relation 
with ASEAN as that BTR index shows, HM index illustrates the high degree of ASEAN 
countries’ reliance on Chinese market, especially Singapore and Malaysia.  
Third, the role of ASEAN may be outstanding when considered as a de facto sub-
regional integrated economic unity. From Korea’s standing point, the whole market of 
ASEAN is slightly more important than that of Japan; while on the side of Japan, the market 
of ASEAN is indeed far more weighed than that of Korea. In comparison to the minor 
position in the case that they play individually, it might be more beneficial for ASEAN 
members to move synchronically as a group when liberalizing trade relations with other 
countries. Furthermore, the indicators suggest Singapore and Malaysia to be a “united” sub-
regional hub within ASEAN: Singapore has a very open economy, the free trade policy and 
advanced trade infrastructure ensures its position as one of the major hubs of ocean 
transportation. Malaysia and Singapore and Malaysia are geographically close to each other. 
They have long historical connections (as Singapore used to be part of Malaysia before 25 
WWII). Malaysia plus Singapore will give them a total GDP that is larger than Indonesia, the 
biggest economy in ASEAN.  
Forth, on the level of aggregate trade, the two Oceania countries are closely related to 
East Asian economies especially Japan. About 20 percent of exports from Australia go to 
Japan, which is double the overall flow to the US and 50 percent more than the total exports 
to the EU. For both of them, Japan may be the first country in East Asia they consider about 
when liberalizing trade bilaterally.  
4.5  The “economic map” of East Asian regionalism 
To sum up, one can image an “economic map” of the market-led integration in East Asia 
where Japan may stay in the center of the regional trading bloc in terms of the market 
importance and the economic distance; Singapore plus Malaysia might play as the hub 
connecting all the other ASEAN members. Figure 1 shows that Japan holds a vital position in 
Asian regional trading bloc. Even though China is catching up as the second biggest market in 
the region, it seems that Japan is undoubtedly the biggest open market in the region and in 
consequence, one of the greatest exports destinations to most of the Asian countries.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
4.6  The fundamental arrangement(s) of East Asian regionalism 
Generally speaking, there is so far not a single FTA or FTA under negotiation seems to 
have grasped the ‘universal gravitation’ to all the countries in the region. The ‘wild fire’ of 
Asian regionalism may refer to a situation where countries are running out to initialize their 
own FTA, but no one is willing to join those agreements set up by others. It is well 
understood that ASEAN members are relatively too small in economic size individually. It 
may be better for them to move together to negotiate free trade with other countries. They still 26 
need to seek either China or Japan as their initial ally in order to generate a united market 
large enough to persuade other countries to join the agreement.  
China seemed to have moved from a passive participant in regionalism to an active 
promoter of regional trade liberalization after its entry to WTO. China signed a FTA with 
ASEAN in late 2004 (CAFTA), which is supposed to create the most populous FTA in the 
world – with over 1.7 billion consumers and a total GDP of nearly 2 trillion US dollars. 
Compared to the progress of Japan-Korea free trade negotiation, the negotiation between 
China and ASEAN started later but reached the agreement earlier. This may make the 
Japanese government feel under pressure to participate into the process of regional trade 
liberalization. Indeed Japan accelerated a series of FTA negotiations with individual ASEAN 
members when CAFTA was publicly announced. It has signed agreements (or has started 
formal negotiations) with main ASEAN members (Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia). In the context, all these FTA or FTA under negotiations will be loosely called the 
Japan-ASEAN FTA (JAFTA) for the simplicity. 
In principle, it seems either the CAFTA or the JAFTA seems to be capable of giving 
birth to a market that is big enough to marginalize the economies outside the arrangement. 
Though it might still be difficult to predict which one of the arrangements would be more 
appealing, the fact that the former is already in its position, plus Korea’s de facto trade 
reliance on China, may persuade more weigh to be put on CAFTA. The substantive 
provisions of the China-ASEAN FTA will implement zero tariffs on bilateral trade in ten 
years. As one can witness, Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand are now talking to either 
China or/and ASEAN for an FTA. The rationale behind the scene is that once there is a 
dominant market generated by FTA in the region, the risk to be an “outsider” would be more 
and more costly along with the progress of regional trade liberalization.    27 
From the perspective of Japan, the CAFTA seems to be last FTA that it would like to 
see. The complementarities of Japan and China are rather apparent; the former is capital 
abundant, labor expensive but resource scare; while the latter has the largest population and 
the third largest territory in the world. Historically, Japan might have “enjoyed” treating 
China as one of its “production bases” in East Asia. As Japan is shifting its economy to high 
value-added, service-focused industry, it outsources more and more fragmented 
manufacturing processes to China. One of the typical routines is that it exports high-tech 
intensive or capital-intensive parts and components to China, and finishes those labor-
intensive procedures there. The cheap labor cost in China may guarantee the competitiveness 
of Japanese products in the global market. Japan has been China’s biggest trade partner for 
ten years while China is currently Japan’s biggest partner as well. An FTA between China and 
some other nations would probably pose negative impacts on Japan’s exports either via the 
direct trade diversification effect or by weakening its competitiveness because China will not 
only import more final goods from those countries having FTA with it but also buy more 
intermediate goods from those preferential partners.  
However, Japan may receive supports from the two Oceania economies -Australia and 
New Zealand, who are strongly Asia-oriented and depend on East Asian markets deeply. 
Being excluded from East Asian regional integration may cost them much. In comparison 
with the other participants, Australia and New Zealand are at an inferior position 
geographically but they try to compensate this disadvantage by unilaterally lowering trade 
barriers. It has been for a long time that Japan provides them the biggest market in East Asia. 
To either of them, a joint deal with Japan may be an ideal choice to engage more deeply into 
Asian regional integration. 
Similarly, Korea will not be happy to see an FTA between China and another nation 
party without its participation, typically CAFTA. As seen above, Korea’s export industries 28 
depend on the Chinese economy (19.5 percent) much more deeply than on the Japanese 
market (8.8 percent). China is currently the largest market for Korea while ASEAN is the fifth. 
The implementation of the CAFTA will generate the world’s most populous market. The 
preferential treatment between China and ASEAN would very likely diversify Korea’s 
original exports to either of the markets. More seriously, effects of market agglomeration will 
not only force more industries to relocate in China-ASEAN free trade zone but also diversify 
foreign investments away from Korea. In order to avoid these negative effects, Seoul might 
choose either to join the agreement early or to contend with it by initiating, for instance, its 
own FTA with Japan.      
After concluding an agreement with China in 2004, ASEAN seems to be a focus of East 
Asian regionalism as Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand rush in for an FTA. By early 
2005, all of them announced that they were going to open free trade negotiations with 
ASEAN. (Asia Monthly, 2004) In order to play a role as a real nucleus of Asian regionalism, 
ASEAN must first of all realize a single market or at least a highly integrated market among 
its ten member nations. The integration is not easily achievable, however, due to the wide 
difference in economic development among its members.     
5.  Concluding remarks 
This paper explores a new approach to evaluate the de facto trade liberalization in quantitative 
by producing the BTR index. In combination with the HM index that measures the relative 
market importance, the calculation of the BTR index and the “economic distance” makes it 
possible to quantitatively compare the de facto bilateral trade relation between East Asian 
countries in relative terms. It opens another door to monitor the progress of economic 
integration from the aspect of international trade in an intuitive way.  
Applying the BTR index into the study on East Asian regionalism, the study from the 
economic perspective suggests Japan and China to be the two individual “hub” candidates 29 
who may play determinant role in the regional integration – any fundamental arrangement of 
East Asian regionalism should involve at least one of them. Currently, CAFTA seems to be an 
agreement that may trigger domino effects of regionalism in East Asia. Once it is fully 
implemented, it would be very difficult for the others such as Japan and Korea to keep away 
from that arrangement. The fear of being fall into the “spoke trap” may drive other nations to 
be more active in trade liberalization, which could effectively spur regional integration in East 
Asia. From this prospective, CAFTA might be a milestone of East Asian regional integration.  
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Table 1: Estimations of the de facto intra-regional trade bias in East Asia 
































































































































countries as the importers   
0.57 
(0.063) *** 
   
 0.46 
(0.148) *** 
   
DUMMY East Asian 
countries import from 
non-East Asian countries 
    
0.66 
(0.067) *** 
     0.31 
(0.122) * 
DUMMY_East Asian 




   0.71 
(0.116) *** 
  
DUMMY East Asian 
countries export to non-
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1.09 
(0.062) *** 
     0.62 
(0.131) *** 
DUMMY_ East Asian 
countries trade with each 
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2 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88 
N 8671 8671  8671  8671  8671  8671  8671  8671  8671  8671 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Sources: Data from year 1990 to 2002. The data of GDP and GDP per capita comes from WDI 2004, the data of distance comes from CEP II geography database; the bilateral trade in 
intermediate goods is from the calculation based on UN COMTRADE database 2004. 31 
 
Table 2: The BTR matrix for the selected Asian countries 
 Korea  China  Australia  New 
Zealand  Indonesia Malaysia  Philippines Singapore Thailand VietNam 
Japan  0.85 0.45 0.36 1.03 0.34 0.27 0.69 0.29 0.27 2.38 
Korea    0.20 0.17 0.50 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.17 
China      0.14 0.39 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.05 
Australia      0.34  0.17  0.17  0.24  0.17  0.17  0.68 
New  Zealand       0.30  0.16  0.22  0.40  0.26  0.56 
Indonesia        0.12  0.03  0.27  0.06  0.02 
Malaysia         0.05  0.28  0.07  0.11 
Philippines          0.23  0.06  0.09 
Singapore           0.14  0.15 
Thailand           0.15 
Source: Author’s calculation based on UN COMTRADE database 2004.   
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Table 3: The estimated economic distance between countries 
 Korea  China  Australia 
New 
Zealand 
Indonesia Malaysia  Philippines Singapore Thailand VietNam 
Japan  980  938  2770 9836 1975 1435 2032 1520 1239 8651 
Korea    188  1443  5126  296 364 372 558 403 461 
China      1215  4303 73  215 120 568 133 111 
Australia        784  922  1137 1494 1036 1240 5240 
New  Zealand          2353 1412 1846 3407 2573 5616 
Indonesia            135 83 233  127 70 
Malaysia         117  88  81  220 
Philippines          530  130  149 
Singapore           195  325 
Thailand            144 
Source: Author’s calculation based on UN COMTRADE database 2004.   33 
Table 4: HM matrix for the selected Asian countries 
Japan China Korea Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Australia New Zealand
Japan 12.72% 4.89% 1.04% 2.10% 1.46% 2.89% 2.22% 1.64% 0.28%
(1) (2) (8) (5) (7) (3) (4) (6) (9)
China 7.68% 3.16% 0.73% 1.17% 0.75% 1.85% 0.74% 1.14% 0.15%
(1) (2) (8) (4) (6) (3) (7) (5) (9)
Korea 8.77% 19.45% 1.86% 1.85% 1.66% 2.49% 1.10% 1.39% 0.19%
(2) (1) (4) (5) (6) (3) (8) (7) (9)
Indonesia 20.71% 7.22% 7.14% 3.55% 1.35% 9.35% 1.82% 3.33% 0.26%
(1) (3) (4) (5) (8) (2) (7) (6) (9)
Malaysia 10.67% 10.89% 3.20% 1.86% 1.39% 13.14% 3.39% 2.20% 0.34%
(3) (2) (5) (7) (8) (1) (4) (6) (9)
Philippines 14.51% 10.36% 3.71% 0.58% 4.47% 6.81% 3.79% 1.00% 0.06%
(1) (2) (6) (8) (4) (3) (5) (7) (9)
Singapore 6.97% 14.06% 3.99% n.a. 15.43% 2.27% 4.03% 2.61% 0.33%
(3) (2) (5) (9) (1) (7) (4) (6) (8)
Thailand 14.11% 9.16% 1.83% 1.86% 3.92% 1.69% 7.54% 2.01% 0.27%
(1) (2) (7) (6) (4) (8) (3) (5) (9)
Australia 18.50% 9.97% 8.30% 2.51% 1.91% 0.96% 4.12% 1.78% 5.76%
(1) (2) (3) (6) (7) (9) (5) (8) (4)
New Zealand 11.58% 6.72% 4.46% 1.48% 1.92% 1.52% 1.26% 1.21% 19.83%
(2) (3) (4) (7) (5) (6) (8) (9) (1)
Overall ranking 15 18 38 63 40 65 31 56 49 75  
Source: Author’s calculation based on UN COMTRADE database 2004.   
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Table 5: HM index of East Asian economies on the selected markets (%) 
Japan China Korea ASEAN5 USA EU
(a) aggregate trade
Japan 12.72 4.89 9.90 24.58 13.95
China  7.68 3.16 5.26 17.84 13.35
Korea  8.77 19.45       9.00 19.41 13.16
Indonesia 20.71  7.22 7.14 16.01      13.10 13.78
Malaysia 10.67 10.89       3.20 21.55 20.08 12.17
Philippines 14.51 10.36 3.71 15.72 24.33 18.01
Thailand 14.11  9.16 1.83 15.37 19.81 15.91
Australia 18.5  9.97       8.30 11.28       9.67 12.37
New Zealand 11.58  6.72 4.46        7.38      15.44     15.00
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on UN COMTRADE database 2004.   
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